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SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11: A CROSS-
CIRCUIT COMPARISON
Jerold S. Solovy*
Norman M Hirsch*
Margaret J. Simpson*
Christina T Tomaras*
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to strike a
careful balance. Its object is to "'reduce frivolous claims, defenses,
or motions, and... deter costly meritless maneuvers""' and other
abuses of the litigation process. At the same time, it seeks to
preserve fair access to the courts and not to deter the presentation of
novel legal contentions or impede zealous advocacy.
As discussed below, the circuit courts have often approached
Rule 11 and-implicitly-the balancing it entails in different ways.
In this article, we compare the circuit courts' approaches to Rule 11
in two areas: (1) the analysis of when a paper, including a
complaint, can be sanctioned for the presenter's improper purpose,
and (2) the safeguards afforded an attorney or party before the
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, including the standard to be applied
when a court imposes sanctions on its own initiative, and the safe
harbor provision found in Rule 11.
I. SANCTIONING PAPERS PRESENTED FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES
Both the 1983 and current 1993 versions of Rule 11 expressly
bar a pleading, motion, or paper that is presented for "any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
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1. Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (1 lth Cir. 2003)
(quoting Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
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increase in the cost of litigation."2 The Rule lists three examples of
improper purposes-harassment, delay, and unnecessary increase in
the cost of litigation-but this list is not exclusive. 3  Beyond
harassment, delay, and cost increase, courts have imposed sanctions
in a number of other situations where circumstances suggested the
presenter had a purpose other than to vindicate rights in court.
Among the many examples, courts have found an improper purpose
where a paper was presented only to determine whether it would be
opposed,4 or to discover information that would provide the basis for
a legitimate lawsuit.5 Parties have also been sanctioned for seeking
to bleed an opposing party's resources, 6 for presenting papers with
the purpose of attempting to avoid an earlier, valid settlement,7 and
for bringing an action for purely political or economic purposes.8
The improper purpose prong of Rule 11 creates a tension among
competing policies and is subject to significant questions of
interpretation. As one court has explained, "[t]he challenge facing
the court... is to construe the Rule in a manner that will promote
the goal of limiting harassment, delay and expense, without
impeding zealous advocacy or freezing the common law in the status
quo."9 However, the Rule provides little guidance as to how it
should be construed to achieve the correct balance.
For example, the Rule bars papers presented for "any" improper
purpose, and does not by its terms require even that the improper
purpose outweigh the presenter's proper purpose of vindicating
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (1983). In fact, the 1993 amendment did not change
the text of the "improper purpose" provisions of the rule at all. FED. R. CiV. P.
SlI(b)(1).
3. For a collection of fact patterns in which courts have awarded sanctions
based on the improper purpose prong of Rule 11, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 212-14 (3d ed. 2000).
4. See Cohen v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir.
1986).
5. Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 2001).
6. See Smith v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 98 C 5903, 2000 WL
549483, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000).
7. See Conservative Club of Wash. v. Finkelstein, 738 F. Supp. 6, 14-15
(D.D.C. 1990).
8. See Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
Libyans' suit against President Reagan for damages from air strikes brought
for improper purpose of making a political statement).
9. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med. Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1476 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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rights in court.'0 Many papers, including complaints, are presented
for multiple purposes, some of which may be "improper." If "any"
improper purpose taints a complaint, motion or other paper, zealous
advocacy may well be chilled, and courts and litigants forced tospend too much time in costly Rule 11 disputes.1'1 Thus, the Rule is
subject to the line-drawing problem of figuring out just how much of
an improper purpose will cause a paper to become sanctionable.
Moreover, the phrase "improper purpose" suggests that the
presenter's subjective purposes for presenting a paper should be
considered. However, subjective inquiry into the presenter's state of
mind when presenting the paper also increases the cost of Rule 11
disputes and contrasts with the objective analysis by which
frivolousness inquiries are tested. 12  As we discuss below, the
different circuits have addressed the competing policies underlying
the Rule, and the problems of interpretation, in somewhat different
ways.
A. The Improper Purpose Inquiry: Subjective or Objective Standard
Although "improper purpose" suggests that the presenter's state
of mind should be the primary focus of a court's inquiry, there is in
fact general agreement among the circuits that the improper purpose
inquiry employs an objective standard. 13 The inquiry goes to the
presenter's purpose, as demonstrated by the totality of the
circumstances at the time the paper is filed. 14 The court looks to
objective indicators of purpose from which to infer improper
purpose, rather than conducting an inquiry into the presenter's
subjective bad faith. For example, a litigant who makes multiple
claims or motions that are substantially identical to earlier,
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (b)(1).
11. See Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Sanctions for Nonfrivolous
Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the Improper
Purpose Prong ofRule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1998).
12. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986).
13. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th
Cir. 2003); G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir.
2003); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2002);
Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 118 (7th Cir. 1994); In re
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990).
14. It does not go to whether the opposing party was, in its subjective view,
harassed or annoyed by the filing.
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unsuccessful motions is often sanctioned for harassment. 15 Courts
will also infer an improper purpose to harass if the claim falls into an
established pattern of frivolous claims, 16 or a frivolous claim or
paper is presented in circumstances which suggest that the presenter
has a motive to harass.
17
An improper purpose to delay proceedings will be found when a
litigant suggests that his purpose in presenting a paper is to cause
delay.' 8  But the improper purpose may also be inferred if the
presenting party stands to benefit from a delay. 19 Even if a party
does not so stand to benefit, a court may award sanctions if a party
ignores the court's procedures for effectively conducting litigation,
and instead files excessive and unnecessary papers.
20
Despite their general agreement on the objective standard, the
circuits have disagreed as to whether the state of mind of the
presenter is a proper factor even to consider when analyzing the
objective circumstances of the filing. On one side of the question,
the Seventh Circuit has supported inquiring into the presenter's state
of mind. For example, in Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,
the court referred to the "subjective component" of the improper
purpose analysis and declared that "the district court must find out
why Szabo-Digby pursued this litigation." 2' The Seventh Circuit
explained that, in its view, Rule 11 "effectively picks up the torts of
abuse of process... and malicious prosecution." 2 Abuse of process
corresponds to the improper purpose prong of Rule 11 in this
analysis; the Restatement defines that tort as "us[ing] a legal process,
whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a
15. See, e.g., Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1989); Fox v.
Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 36-38 (2d Cir. 1986); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d
1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 784 F.2d 777,
782 (7th Cir. 1986).
16. See Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1985).
17. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 410-11 (4th Cir. 1999); see
Derechin v. State Univ. of N.Y., 963 F.2d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 1992).
18. See Bay State Towing Co. v. Barge Am. 21, 899 F.2d 129, 132-33 (1st
Cir. 1990).
19. See Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1994).
20. See Kapco Mfg. Co., v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1492 (7th
Cir. 1989).
21. 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987).
22. Id.
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purpose for which it is not designed .... ,
23
In contrast, other circuits hold that the improper purpose
evaluation should be purely objective, and the presenter's state of
mind should not be a target of the analysis. The Second Circuit has
been the most sensitive to this issue. In Oliveri v. Thompson,24 the
court rejected its suggestion in an earlier case25 that inquiry into an
attorney's state of mind at the time of the filing might be relevant to
an improper purpose charge, holding instead that "there is no
necessary subjective component to a proper Rule 11 analysis."
26
"Removing any subjective good faith component from Rule 11
analysis," explained the Second Circuit, "should reduce the need for
satellite litigation when a district court is called upon to impose a
Rule 11 sanction., 27 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "[a]n
attorney's subjective intent in filing is... irrelevant to the Rule 11
analysis."
28
The Fourth Circuit has stated that it is appropriate to consider a
presenter's subjective beliefs to determine the purpose of the filing,
but only as revealed by an admission by the presenter that she "knew
that the motion or pleading was baseless but filed it nonetheless.,
29
As the court notes, however, the limited exception for admissions is
subjective only in the sense that it involves a state of mind inquiry; it
is objective in the sense that a presenter's admission on the record
"can be viewed by a court without fear of misinterpretation; it does
not involve difficult determinations of credibility."
30
In our view, Rule 1 I's purposes are best satisfied by an
objective inquiry that does not delve into disputed evidence
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977). Malicious
prosecution, on the other hand, requires that the lawsuit be without merit. See
Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The
difference between abuse of process and malicious prosecution is that the
former does not require proving that the lawsuit was brought without probable
cause.").
24. 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
25. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985).
26. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1275.
27. Id.
28. Westlake N. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d
1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990).
29. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 519 (4th Cir. 1990).
30. Id.
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regarding a presenter's subjective reasons for filing a paper.
Subjective inquiry into the presenter's state-of-mind when filing a
paper adds significantly to the cost of Rule 11 determinations. The
prospect of costly satellite Rule 11 litigation could well deter
litigants and their attorneys from pursuing novel claims or offbeat,
but not abusive, litigation strategies. Moreover, inquiring into
subjective motivations does not appear to us to afford much
additional benefit in terms of deterring litigants from filing papers to
harass, delay, and otherwise abuse the litigation process.
B. Mixed Purposes
Rule 11 has two separate prongs: first that a pleading, written
motion, or other paper not be presented for any improper purpose
and second, that it be well-grounded in fact and law.3 1 In general,
the circuits have adhered to the plain text of Rule 11 and held that an
attorney or party may be sanctioned under the improper purpose
clause even if the paper he or she presents is otherwise
nonfrivolous
3 2
However, many papers are presented for multiple purposes,
some of which may be considered improper. Although the language
of Rule 1 l(b)(1) authorizes sanctions if the filing is tainted by any
improper purpose,33 in practice courts are often hesitant to impose
sanctions when those improper purposes are combined with proper
purposes. These circuits reason that a party presenting a
nonfrivolous paper has, by definition, a legal position deserving of
the court's attention. Only when the valid legal position is
subordinate to the other illegitimate motives of the filer will
sanctions be appropriate. Thus, the Fourth Circuit has held that "the
purpose to vindicate rights in court must be central and sincere.,
3 4
This position is similar to that of the Fifth Circuit, which holds that
sanctions should be imposed on a nonfrivolous filing motivated by
31. FED. R. CIv. P. I1(a)-(b).
32. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., 332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th Cir.
2003); Senese v. Chi. Area I.B. of T. Pension Fund, 237 F.3d 819, 826 (7th
Cir. 2001); Cohen v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir.
1986). Certain circuits have made an exception for nonfrivolous complaints
filed for an improper purpose, which we discuss below.
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
34. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518.
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an improper purpose "only under unusual circumstances. 35
One purpose that is quite common and that underlies even
meritorious filings is the desire to generate adverse publicity toward
one's opponent. While courts do not look favorably on the desire to
embarrass an opponent, there is some disagreement about whether
and when such a purpose warrants sanctions. A recent case from the
Fifth Circuit, Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc.,36 provides
a "colorful" example. Whitehead arose out of an attorney's efforts to
collect a judgment on behalf of his client, who had been abducted
from the parking lot of a Mississippi Kmart and raped.37 A jury
found Kmart negligent because it did not provide parking lot
security, and a judgment of $3.4 million was entered.38
The trial court rejected Kmart's motions for a new trial and a
stay of execution of the judgment.39 Three days later, the victim's
attorney, Minor, decided to act to speed up the process.4 0  He
presented a handwritten request to the clerk of the district court
(presenting this handwritten request to the court brought his actions
within the ambit of Rule 11), and obtained a writ of execution.
4 1
Minor then alerted the media that he planned to execute the
judgment, with the assistance of two U.S. Marshals, at the Kmart
where the abduction of his client had occurred.42 With reporters in
tow, Minor and the Marshals arrived at the Kmart and attempted to
execute the judgment by seizing cash from its registers and vault.
4 3
Before any cash was seized, however, the district court stayed the
execution.
44
The district court imposed an $8,000 sanction against Minor, the
sum of the attorneys' fees incurred by Kmart in opposing the
execution.4 5  A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
35. Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 891 F.2d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 1990).
One example of such unusual circumstances, according to the court, is the
filing of excessive motions. Id.
36. 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
37. Id. at 799.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 800.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 801.
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Minor's actions did not amount to an "exceptional circumstance" in
which the Fifth Circuit imposes sanctions when a filing is motivated
by both proper and improper purposes.46 Although his supposed
intent to publicly embarrass Kmart was imjroper, his purpose of
collecting a valid judgment was legitimate. The Fifth Circuit en
banc reinstated the sanctions.48 In the full court's view, Minor's
alleged intent to embarrass Kmart far outweighed the legitimate
motives he claimed to have-to collect the judgment49 or to force a
settlement.
50
The Whitehead court purported to decide the case under the
Fifth Circuit's position that a mixed purpose filing would be
sanctioned only under unusual circumstances.5 1 Chief Judge King
disagreed. In dissent, he argued that his colleagues, "plainly
exercised about. .. Minor's efforts to collect his clients'
judgment,"52 and relying on insufficient findings of fact by the
district court, had chosen a poor case to serve as the "benchmark" for
imposing improper purpose sanctions in the future. 3 While Minor's
technique was "colorful to say the least," 54 the Chief Judge noted, it
was not unusual in a judgment collection setting, where attempts to
embarrass one's opponent and to gain publicity for oneself are "quite
common characteristics.
' 5
The Second Circuit, in a case that also involved a lawyer's
attempts to cultivate media support, reached a different conclusion.
Sussman v. Bank of Israel arose out of the collapse of an Israeli bank,
56NAB. NAB's Receiver sued Sussman and other directors of NAB
46. Id. at 801-02.
47. Id. at 802.
48. Id. at 802-04, 809.
49. Id. at 806. The court observed that a single Kmart was unlikely to have
the $3.4 million of cash on hand. Id.
50. Id. The court assumed arguendo that forcing a settlement is not an
improper purpose, but noted there is some authority to the contrary. Id. (citing
Elster v. Alexander, 122 F.R.D. 593, 604 (N.D. Ga. 1988)).
51. Id. at 805-06.
52. Id. at 809 (King, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 814 (King, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge King pointed out that
the Fifth Circuit had never before imposed sanctions on a filing presented for
an improper purpose without also finding the filing was frivolous. Id. at 813
(King, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 814 (King, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. (King, C.J., dissenting).
56. 56 F.3d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1995).
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in Israeli court (the Israeli action), alleging negligence and breach of
fiduciary duties.57 In the action in Israel, Sussman brought a third
party claim against the Bank of Israel (BOI), alleging the bank had
negligently failed to supervise NAB's activities.58  Sussman
subsequently brought substantially similar claims in federal court in
New York against BOI, three BOI officials, the Israeli Ministry of
Finance, and another Israeli bank with a branch office in New York
(the New York action). 59
BOI moved for sanctions, arguing that they were warranted
because the complaint contained numerous claims which were
groundless or false, and because the New York action was brought
for the improper purpose of forcing settlement of the Israeli action by
generating negative publicity against the Bank of Israel. 60 As
evidence of this purpose, BOI pointed to letters Sussman's attorneys
had sent it before filing the complaint, threatening litigation if the
"baseless claims" made against Sussman in the Israeli action were
not dropped, and pointing out that the New York action was sure to
discourage investors from doing business with BOI.61 For BOI,
adverse publicity came to pass, as articles in which Sussman's
lawyer criticized it and the Israeli government appeared in The New
York Times and The Jerusalem Post.62 The district court refused to
rule on BOI's allegations of frivolousness, but imposed sanctions on
improper purpose grounds, holding that "the filing of a complaint in
a highly doubtful venue, for the express purpose of putting pressure
on a foreign government to drop or compromise that government's
action against the plaintiffs in the foreign nation's courts, furnishes a
stark example of improper and oppressive litigation."
63
The court of appeals reversed.64 The court first disagreed with
the defendants that Sussman's claims were frivolous. 65 Next, the
court held that making a nonfrivolous filing "with a view to exerting
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 453.
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id. (quoting Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 154 F.R.D. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)).
64. Id. at 460.
65. Id. at 457.
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pressure on defendants through the generation of adverse and
economically disadvantageous publicity" was not an improper
purpose at all.66 The court held that Rule 11 was not designed to
safeguard parties from public criticism, if that criticism stemmed
from nonfrivolous legal claims.67 Furthermore, in the court's view,
attempts to deter attorneys from speaking to the press, or to punish
them for doing so, would carry "serious First Amendment
implications."
68
Whitehead and Sussman illustrate the difficulties courts have in
agreeing when a purpose is improper and in determining just how
much of an "improper" purpose will cause a paper to be sanctionable
under Rule 11. Compared to the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit
appears to be more tolerant of attorneys who wish to enlist the press
in their battles. It is possible to overstate the difference between the
two cases, because the filing at issue in Sussman was a complaint,
69
while Whitehead involved a paper presented later in the litigation.
70
Still, the Second Circuit refused even to declare Sussman's purpose
of generating negative publicity to be improper,7' while the Fifth
Circuit imposed sanctions on that basis on a nonfrivolous paper.72 It
remains to be seen whether the decision in Whitehead stems from the
court's impatience with what appeared to be a particularly
flamboyant media stunt or represents a more general disapproval of
litigants' appeals to the media.
C. Can Nonfrivolous Complaints Be Improper?
1. Disagreement among the circuits
The text of Rule 11 supports the position that an attorney or
party may be sanctioned under the improper purpose clause, even if
the paper she presents is otherwise nonfrivolous. 73 In this regard, the
Rule contains no textual support to treat complaints differently than
66. Id. at 459.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 451.
70. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss. Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 799-80 (5th
Cir. 2003).
71. See Sussman, 56 F.3d at 459.
72. See Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 809.
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b)-(c).
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any other paper. Thus the Seventh and the Fourth Circuits have
stated positions that otherwise nonfrivolous complaints may be
sanctioned under the improper purpose clause.74
However, notwithstanding the plain language of the Rule, where
the paper in question is an initial complaint, several circuits have
carved out an exception to the Rule that otherwise nonfrivolous
papers may be sanctioned for an improper purpose. This view,
which was first adopted by the Ninth Circuit,75 has been followed by
the Second Circuit, 76 the Fifth Circuit,
77 and the Tenth Circuit.78
The Ninth Circuit explained the public policy reasons behind the
complaint exception in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp. 79 The
complaint, explained the Ninth Circuit, as "the document which
embodies the plaintiff's cause of action and... the vehicle through
which he enforces his substantive legal rights," occupies a unique
position in litigation. 80 The enforcement of these substantive legal
rights is important not only to the plaintiff asserting them but also
potentially to "the public, since the bringing of meritorious lawsuits
by private individuals is one way that public policies are
74. See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th
Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit has stated a position similar to that of the
Seventh Circuit. In In re Kunstler, the court stated, in dicta:
[I]f a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, and also for
some other purpose, a court should not sanction counsel for an
intention that the court does not approve, so long as the added purpose
is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate a
proper purpose. Thus, the purpose to vindicate rights in court must be
central and sincere.
914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990). In practice, cases that sanction otherwise
meritorious complaints for violating the improper purpose clause are rare. See,
e.g., Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117, 122 (E.D.N.C. 1991)
(citing Szabo and holding that despite the reasonableness of the complaint:
[plaintiff] had a dual motive in filing the lawsuit: the legitimate
purpose of seeking relief for the loss of his job and the improper
purpose of harassing [a defendant] .. . I conclude that even though the
pleading may have been well grounded in law or fact, the fact that it
was filed for an improper purpose violates Rule 11.)
75. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. See Sussman, 56 F.3d at 458.
77. See Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1988).
78. SeeBurkhartv. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988).
79. 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
80. Id. at 1362.
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advanced."'', The Ninth Circuit concluded that, from a policy
standpoint, it would be counterproductive to sanction nonfrivolous,
substantive claims, "even when the motives for asserting those
claims are not entirely pure."8 2  The Second Circuit adopted the
Townsend court's analysis, stating that "[a] party should not be
penalized for or deterred from seeking and obtaining warranted
judicial relief merely because one of his multiple purposes in seeking
that relief may have been improper.
8 3
In In re Marsch,8 the Ninth Circuit applied its own policy
reasons for the complaint exception to reach an entirely different
result in the bankruptcy context. The Ninth Circuit in Marsch first
acknowledged that "[a] plain reading of the rule's language
suggests... separate requirements, so that either frivolousness or
improper purpose may serve as a basis for sanctions," and that in
Townsend, it had "subordinate[d] the language [of the Rule] ... to
policy considerations."8 5 The court reasoned:
In deciding whether to follow Townsend's lead (in applying
Bankruptcy Rule 9011, which uses language virtually
identical to Rule 11)... we must ask whether the policy
considerations that prompted the court there to depart from
the clear language of FRCP 11 apply with equal force in the
bankruptcy context. We conclude they do not. While
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Nat 7
Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 844 F.2d at 224 ("A plaintiff must file a complaint,
however, in order to vindicate his rights in court."); Burkhart, 852 F.2d at 515
(stating, without explanation, that where the complaint was well-grounded,
"any suggestion of harassment would necessarily fail."). In addition to the
policy reasons for the complaint exception, the Fifth Circuit in National
Association of Government Employees reasoned that a finding that a complaint
was filed for an improper purpose would require a purely subjective inquiry
into the filing party's state of mind at the time the lawsuit was initiated. Nat 7
Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 849 F.2d at 224. However, an otherwise
nonfrivolous complaint could logically be found to be filed for improper
purpose based on the objective circumstances of its filing--such as, for
example, timing from which one can infer an improper purpose, see, e.g.,
Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbecue Corp., 130 F.R.D. 665, 669 (W.D. Mo. 1990),
aff'd, 932 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1991), or the fact that the amount plaintiff could
recover even if successful is very low relative to the cost of litigation.
84. 36 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1994).
85. Id. at 829-30.
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bankruptcy proceedings serve important purposes, they
seldom carry the broad policy implications of many federal
lawsuits, such as those seeking enforcement of
environmental or antitrust laws. At the same time,
experience has shown that bankruptcy proceedings are
subject to a degree of manipulation and abuse not typical of
civil litigation. 
6
Despite rejecting the Townsend result for bankruptcy cases, the
Marsch court "accept[ed] Townsend's basic teaching, which is that
frivolousness and improper purpose are not wholly independent
considerations but 'will often overlap."' 8 7 The Ninth Circuit then
adopted a novel solution for Bankruptcy Rule 9011: "We conclude
that bankruptcy courts [considering sanctioning a bankruptcy
petition] must consider both frivolousness and improper purpose on
a sliding scale, where the more compelling the showing as to one
element, the less decisive need be the showing as to the other."
88
The circuits that have carved out the complaint exception clearly
are motivated by a concern that sanctioning a litigant's improper
purposes for bringing a lawsuit will unduly burden and deter litigants
from legitimate efforts to seek redress from the courts, to the
detriment of both the individual litigants and the public. However,
the rule they have adopted---that improper purpose is never sufficient
to sanction a complaint that has any merit-may also be motivated
by a line-drawing concern. In other words, these circuits may have
determined that it is too difficult for district courts to determine how
great a showing of improper purpose is needed to sanction a
complaint with some merit.
2. Supreme Court guidance
The Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of whether an
otherwise nonfrivolous complaint filed with an improper purpose
would violate Rule 11. However, in two different contexts, the Court
86. Id. at 830 n.2 (detailing the problem of abusive use of bankruptcy
filings by renters to avoid eviction and concluding that "[als those familiar
with bankruptcy practice are only too painfully aware, this type of strategic
manipulation isn't limited to renters' petitions.").
87. Id. at 830 (quoting Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d
1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
88. Id.
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has examined whether a litigant may be penalized for bringing a
nonfrivolous lawsuit based on his or her purpose for doing so-in
1993 in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. (PRE),89 and in 2002 in BE&K Construction Co. v.
NLRB (BE&K).90 PRE and BE&K make clear that penalizing
litigants with nonfrivolous claims because of their purposes for
bringing those claims raises concerns under the First Amendment
right to petition.91
In PRE, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
otherwise well-grounded efforts to litigate cannot be within the
"sham" exception to the Noerr/Pennington doctrine of immunity
from antitrust liability.92  The Second and Tenth Circuits, among
others, had joined the Ninth Circuit in holding that only baseless
efforts to litigate could violate the antitrust laws.
Other courts of appeals had held that some nonfrivolous
litigation could be considered within the sham exception. For
example, the Seventh Circuit had concluded: "[W]e are not prepared
to rule that the difficulty of distinguishing lawful from unlawful
purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute that such
litigation can never be considered an actionable restraint of trade,
provided it has some, though perhaps only threadbare, basis in
89. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
90. 536 U.S. 516 (2002).
91. Id. at 517; PRE, 508 U.S. at 56.
92. PRE, 508 U.S. at 62. The Noerr/Pennington line of cases confer
immunity from antitrust liability for a wide range of activities designed to
induce government bodies to take actions that may have anticompetitive
effects. Noerr also announced a sham exception to the rule where the
defendants' conduct was not designed to secure the benefits of the government
action itself, but instead was designed to impose costs on competitors,
regardless of the outcome of the petition to the government body. E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
So far as we can determine, no court has cited PRE in the Rule 11 context.
This may be because Justice Thomas' opinion in PRE relied heavily on the
earlier antitrust decisions of the Court that had developed the
NoerrIPennington doctrine, without explaining in any detail how those cases
related to the First Amendment right to petition. However, at least two law
review articles have linked the Court's analysis in PRE and the Rule 11
improper purpose cases. See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on
Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665 (2000) and
Thies Kolln, Rule 11 and the Policing of Access to the Courts After
Professional Real Estate Investors, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037 (1994).
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law., 93 "The line is crossed when [the plaintiff's] purpose is not to
win a favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and
deter others, by the process itself-regardless of outcome---of
litigating." 94 Prior to PRE, the Seventh Circuit denied immunity for
the pursuit of valid claims if "the stakes, discounted by the
probability of winning, would be too low to repay the investment in
litigation." 95 The Sixth Circuit treated legal merit of the complaint as
creating a rebuttable presumption of immunity.96 In the Fifth Circuit,
nonfrivolous complaints could be sanctioned if not "significantly
motivated by a genuine desire for judicial relief.,
97
In PRE, the Court, citing its decision in California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,98 stated that recourse to the
courts "should not be condemned as sham until a reviewing court has
'discem[ed] and draw[n]' the 'difficult line' separating objectively
reasonable claims from 'a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims...
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and
judicial processes have been abused.' 99 The Court set forth a two-
part rule.100 First, "the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits." 10 1 Second, "[o]nly if challenged litigation is objectively
meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective
motivation."
10 2
In BE&K, the Court held that the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) could not impose unfair labor practice liability on an
employer's unsuccessful retaliatory suit against a union without a
determination that the suit was baseless. 10 3 In so doing, the Supreme
93. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 1986).
97. In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 528 (1987).
98. 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
99. Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S.
49, 58 (1993) (alterations in original).
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536 (2002). Justice
O'Connor's opinion also left open the possibility that the NLRB may declare
unlawful any unsuccessful but reasonably based suits that would not have been
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Court looked to its decision in PRE for guidance and made explicit
that both decisions are grounded in the Court's recognition that
penalizing litigants for bringing lawsuits for improper purposes
raises concerns under the First Amendment right to petition.
30
BE&K was decided against the backdrop of the Court's 1983
decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB.135 In Bill
Johnson 's, the Court held that the NLRB may not enjoin prosecution
of a state court lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff/employer's
retaliatory motive, unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or
law. 10 6 In dicta that was widely followed for nearly twenty years,1
0 7
the Court then observed:
If judgment goes against the employer in the state court,
however, or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise shown
to be without merit, the employer has had its day in court,
the interest of the State in providing a forum for its citizens
has been vindicated, and the Board may then proceed to
adjudicate the § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice
case. 1
08
Thus, if, after the employer had lost its suit, the Board determined
that the employer undertook the suit to retaliate for the employee's
exercise of activities protected by the NLRA, the Board could order
the employer to reimburse the employee for his or her attorneys'
fees, and other expenses, and order other relief authorized by the
Act. 10 9
In BE&K, the Court faced directly the issue on which it spoke in
filed but for a motive to impose the costs of the litigation process, regardless of
the outcome, in retaliation for NLRA protected activity. Id. at 536-37. Justice
Scalia, in his concurrence, dismissed this possibility, stating:
I agree with JUSTICE BREYER that the implication of our decision
today is that, in a future appropriate case, we will construe the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in the same way we have
already construed the Sherman Act: to prohibit only lawsuits that are
both objectively baseless and subjectively intended to abuse process.
Id. at 537.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 535.
105. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
106. Id at 748-49.
107. See BE&K, 536 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 747.
109. Id.
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dicta in Bill Johnson 's-whether the NLRB could impose liability on
an employer for filing a losing (but not frivolous) retaliatory lawsuit
against unions 1 0 The NLRB agreed that the narrow definition of
"sham" that the Court had adopted in PRE, which requires a
threshold finding that the complaint is baseless, was necessary in the
antitrust context with its treble damages remedy and privately-
initiated lawsuits."' However, the NLRB disputed such restrictions
were necessary in the labor field. 12 The Court disagreed." 3 "At
most," the Court responded, "these arguments demonstrate that the
threat of an antitrust suit may pose a greater burden on petitioning
than the threat of an NLRA adjudication. This does not mean the
burdens posed by the NLRA raise no First Amendment concerns."
'' 14
Although the penalties available to the NLRB were designed to
restore the status quo before the lawsuit-primarily the shifting of
attorneys' fees-the Court was also concerned about the threat of
reputational harm to the employer from the finding that the lawsuit
was illegal."' The Court expressed concern about the harms to the
public of penalizing nonfrivolous lawsuits:
Even unsuccessful but reasonably based suits advance some
First Amendment interests. Like successful suits,
unsuccessful suits allow the 'public airing of disputed
facts,' and raise matters of public concern. They also
promote the evolution of the law by supporting the
development of legal theories that may not gain acceptance
the first time around."
16
PRE and BE&K thus form a body of Supreme Court precedent on
how, given the First Amendment right to petition, the Court
approaches "improper purpose" penalties on litigants.li1
110. See BE&K, 536 U.S. at 524.
111. Id. at 528.
112. Id. at 529.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 529.
115. Id. at 530.
116. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
117. Justice O'Connor stated in BE&K that "nothing in our holding today
should be read to question the validity of common litigation sanctions imposed
by courts themselves-such as those authorized under Rule 11 ... ." Id at
537. This makes sense, because the burdens placed on litigants' right to
petition by Rule 11 sanctions are different than those burdens imposed by a
finding of illegality under the antitrust or labor laws. The importance of PRE
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The issue of whether nonfrivolous complaints may be
sanctioned under Rule 11 for improper purpose is, of course,
distinguishable from questions decided by the Supreme Court in PRE
and BE&K. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Marsch, a plain
reading of the text and structure of Rule 11 argues for sanctioning
nonfrivolous papers if they are filed for any improper purpose, and
provides no reason for treating complaints any differently from other
papers. 118 In contrast, the Court readily concluded that the Sherman
Act at issue in PRE and section 158(a)(1) of the NLRA 119 at issue in
BE&K did not clearly require those statutes to reach nonfrivolous but
wrongly motivated lawsuits. In both cases, the Court refused to
"'impute to Congress an intent to invade' the First Amendment right
to petition. '' 20 In addition, the burdens placed on litigants' speech
by the prospect of Rule 11 sanctions are almost certainly lighter than
those imposed by a finding that the lawsuit was illegal under the
antitrust or labor laws.
12 1
Still, PRE and BE&K show that, if presented with the issue, the
Supreme Court likely will look carefully at a result, like that
contemplated by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Szabo, that allows
litigants to be sanctioned for filing even meritorious complaints for
an improper purpose. The First Amendment concerns addressed by
the Supreme Court in PRE and BE&K are clearly implicated when
and BE&K for Rule 11 improper purpose analysis is to suggest that the First
Amendment right to petition may place limits on courts' ability to sanction
litigants for their purposes in bringing nonfrivolous complaints, not to settle
what those limits are.
118. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
119. Section 158(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits
employers from interfering with employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
120. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S.
49, 56 (1993) (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)); see also BE&K, 536 U.S. at 536-37.
121. Federal judges are charged under the 1993 version of Rule 11 with the
discretion to impose sanctions on parties and attorneys sufficient to deter
frivolous, harassing or other improper filings, not to compensate the opposing
side. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment
("The court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any,
should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions
should not be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the
conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly situated
persons.").
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courts may sanction nonfrivolous complaints for an improper
purpose.122 In this paper, we reach no conclusion about whether
Rule 11 improper purpose sanctions place impermissible burdens on
litigants' First Amendment rights to petition. Even if the burdens on
litigants are not so great as to violate the First Amendment, however,
we agree with the Ninth Circuit's policy analysis in Townsend,
which did not rely on the First Amendment. The policy
consequences of chilling novel claims are simply too great to warrant
sanctioning otherwise nonfrivolous claims for an improper purpose.
Since cases that sanction nonfrivolous complaints for an improper
purpose are rare, it appears to us that most courts have reached the
same conclusion.
Moreover, in our view any paper that presents a court with a
claim, defense, or contention that 1) is warranted by either existing
law or a nonfrivolous argument for a change in law, and 2) that has
evidentiary support should not be sanctioned because of the
presenter's improper purpose. Litigation is filed and litigation
strategies often pursued for equally complex sets of purposes. The
possibility that nonfrivolous papers may be sanctioned because of the
purposes of the presenter may well chill vigorous advocacy. We
believe that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules should consider
recommending an amendment to Rule 11 that makes clear that
litigants may not be sanctioned under the improper purpose clause
for presenting the court with their otherwise nonfrivolous claims and
positions.
II. SAFEGUARDS AFFORDED AN ATTORNEY BEFORE THE IMPOSITION
OF SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11
To achieve a balance between Rule lI 's goal of deterring
frivolous litigation while still providing attorneys and litigants with
the flexibility to pursue novel, yet nonfrivolous legal claims and
theories, 123 Rule 11 also includes certain procedural safeguards.
124
122. Although the Ninth Circuit in Townsend, and the other circuits that
prohibit sanctions on nonfrivolous complaints for improper purpose, did not
frame their policy argument in terms of the First Amendment right to petition,
the policy concerns are the same.
123. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
124. The Rule provides that sanctions can be initiated in one of the following
ways:
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Specifically, in the case of court-initiated sanctions, the 1993
Amendments have changed the sanctioning power of the federal
court from mandatory to discretionary, and in the case of party-
initiated proceedings, the drafters added a "safe harbor" provision to
the Rule, which, among other things, requires a party to serve a
sanctions motion on its opponent twenty-one days prior to filing.'
2 5
These safeguards serve to alleviate the chilling effect that Rule 11
otherwise might have on parties considering raising novel claims or
arguments. The procedural requirements of Rule 11 are clear, and,
for the most part, have been consistently applied by the circuits.
However, there are some differences in how the circuits have applied
these safeguards, and consequently, the amount of protection
afforded to litigants under Rule 11 may differ among the circuits.
A. Court-Initiated Sanctions
Rule 11 requires courts initiating sanction proceedings to issue
an order to show cause before imposing sanctions against a party.
126
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the
specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served
as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the
court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected ....
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate
subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show
cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(1).
125. Id. For a thorough discussion of the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, see
Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REv.
1007 (1999).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. I l(c)(1)(B). The 1993 Amendments also limit the
ability of a court acting on its own initiative to impose monetary sanctions
against a party and limit the amount of such a monetary award to a fine
payable to the court rather than an award of attorneys' fees to the other side.
See FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (c)(2)(B). Further, the Rule permits monetary sanctions
only if the sanctioning "court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is...
to be sanctioned." Id.; See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note
to 1983 amendment (explaining that the 1993 Amendments require that
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The "show cause" order requirement allows a party to defend its
position to the court, but it does not provide that party with an
opportunity to withdraw an offensive pleading and thus avoid the
imposition of sanctions. 27 The text of Rule 11 does not require
district courts to find more egregious conduct before imposing
sanctions on their own initiative than on a party's motion. However,
the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1993 amendments to the Rule
appear to contemplate that "show cause" orders will be imposed only
in "situations that are akin to a contempt of court.'' 28 Specifically,
the Committee stated as follows: "Since show cause orders will
ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of
court, the rule does not provide a 'safe harbor' to a litigant for
withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show cause order has been
issued on the court's own initiative."
129
monetary sanctions imposed by a court acting on its own initiative must be
"limited to a penalty payable to the court and that it be imposed only if the
show cause order is issued before any voluntary dismissal or an agreement of
the parties to settle the claims made by or against the litigant."). The Advisory
Committee explained that "[p]arties settling a case should not be subsequently
faced with an unexpected order from the court leading to monetary sanctions
that might have affected their willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a
case." Id.
127. See FED. R. Cv. P. 1 1(c)(1)(B); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711
(9th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he 'safe harbor' provision applies only to sanctions
imposed upon motion of a party."). The Advisory Committee considered
providing a safe harbor provision for court-initiated sanctions, as well as party-
initiated sanctions, but ultimately rejected the idea. See In re Pennie &
Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 92 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Letter from Hon.
Sam C. Pointer, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon.
Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 525 (1993)).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment; see
also Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1329 (2d Cir. 1995)
("The advisory committee note on the 1993 amendment specifically states that
such sanctions 'will ordinarily be [imposed] only in situations that are akin to a
contempt of court."') (alteration in original).
129. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. The
Committee further stated that "corrective action" in response to a "show cause"
order "should be taken into account in deciding what-if any-sanction to
impose if, after consideration of the litigant's response, the court concludes
that a violation has occurred." Id. In practice, the opportunity for a party to
take corrective action in response to a show cause order rarely arises, as courts
frequently do not issue orders to show cause until the end of the proceedings.
To further protect litigants, Rule 11 requires that all sanctions be
"limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct[,]" and that a
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1. The majority position
Courts considering sua sponte sanctions recognize that some
safeguard must be in place to avoid the potentially harsh
consequences of court-initiated sanctions; the "akin to a contempt"
passage from the Advisory Committee's Note that is quoted above is
often cited in this connection.130 These courts agree that a district
court should use particular care in deciding whether conduct is
sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of sanctions on the
court's own initiative. Nonetheless, these courts apply an objective
standard to determine whether the conduct at issue is sanctionable.
13 1
In other words, courts in a majority of circuits use "particular
stringency" in deciding whether to issue an order to show cause, but
do not require a finding of subjective bad faith before imposing
sanctions.
32
For example, the Fourth Circuit, in Hunter v. Earthgrains Co.
Bakery,13 3 explained that an attorney or party may be sanctioned
only when, in "'applying a standard of objective reasonableness, it
can be said that a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could not
have believed his actions to be legally justified.'"134 In Hunter, the
court issuing a "show cause" order "shall describe the conduct determined to
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2)-(3). See also In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505,
522 (4th Cir. 1990) (disallowing award of attorneys' fees that compensated
defendants rather than deterred frivolous litigation).
130. See, e.g., Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2003); Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir.
2002); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115-16
(9th Cir. 2001); see also Barber, 146 F.3d at 711 (recognizing that courts
initiate sua sponte sanctions only in situations akin to contempt, and thus
refusing to infer that the lower court acted on its own initiative in awarding
sanctions despite moving party's failure to comply with safe harbor provision).
131. See, e.g., Kaplan, 331 F.3d at 1255 (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819
F.2d 1551, 1556 (lth Cir. 1987)); Hunter, 281 F.3d at 153; Truesdell v. S.
Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 209 F.R.D. 169, 174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing
Conn. v. CSO Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992)).
132. See Kaplan, 331 F.3d at 1255; Hunter, 281 F.3d at 153; R&D Latex
Corp., 242 F.3d at 1115; Truesdell, 209 F.R.D. at 174; see also MHC Inv. Co.
v. Racom Corp., 323 F.3d 620, 626 (8'h Cir. 2003) (Rule 11 standards are
applied with particular strictness when sanctions are imposed per a court's own
initiative, but the district court did not err in imposing sua sponte sanctions
when the defendant's counsel persisted in asserting frivolous claims).
133. 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
134. Id. at 153 (quoting In re Sargent, 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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district court issued an order to show cause to plaintiff's counsel, on
the ground that counsel failed to make a sufficient pre-filing inquiry
before initiating a lawsuit and filed four motions that appeared to
violate Rule 11.135 After a hearing on the motion, the district court
concluded that counsel's legal assertions were "utter nonsense" and
suspended her from practice in the Western District of North
Carolina for a period of five years.' 36 The Fourth Circuit vacated the
district court's sanction order and lifted plaintiffs counsel's
suspension. 137 The court noted that, because a "show cause" order
deprives a party of the twenty-one day safe harbor to correct or
withdraw the offending paper, a district court must use "extra care"
in exercising its sanctioning power. 138 According to the court, the
Advisory Committee's Note, which favors the use of court-initiated
sanctions only in situations "akin to contempt," further bolstered its
conclusion that courts should exercise care in awarding sanctions on
their own initiative, at least in those cases where a party does not
have an opportunity to correct the offending paper. 3 9 The court then
concluded that, even though plaintiffs counsel's position was
contrary to circuit precedent, she had some basis for arguing for a
good faith change in the law. 140 Thus, according to the court, her
legal argument before the district court was not frivolous.
14 1
2. The Second Circuit's Pennie & Edmonds decision
In contrast, at least one circuit has interpreted the "akin to
contempt" language used by the Advisory Committee as
incorporating a mens rea requirement. The Second Circuit has held
that a subjective bad faith standard applies when a court assesses
135. Id. at 149 n.4.
136. Id. at 150, 153.
137. Id. at 156-57.
138. Id. at 151 (citing United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d
1102, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2001)).
139. Id. at 151.
140. Id. at 155.
141. Id. at 157. In reaching its decision, the court noted that it stood alone
on one side of a circuit split, with six of its sister circuits taking the position
that plaintiff's counsel advocated. Id. at 154-55. Because of this, the Fourth
Circuit explained that it could not conclude that plaintiff's position had "'no
chance of success."' Id. at 155 (quoting In re Sargent, 136 F.3d 349 (4th Cir.
1998)).
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Rule 11 sanctions on its own initiative. 142 In the case of Pennie &
Edmonds LLP, 4 3 the defendant's attorneys in a trademark
infringement case allegedly knowingly allowed their client to submit
a false affidavit to the court. 144 The court, upon concluding that the
affidavit was false, ordered the attorneys to show cause why their
submission did not violate Rule 11, and ultimately sanctioned the
attorneys for their part in the fraud. 145 Although the court accepted
the attorneys' assertion that they acted in subjective good faith, the
court found that the law firm objectively could not have believed that
the affidavit it filed was true.
146
The Second Circuit, accepting the lower court's finding that the
attorneys acted in good faith, reversed the award of sanctions. 147 In
doing so, the court thus adopted a subjective rather than an objective
standard for determining whether court-initiated sanctions are
appropriate. In reaching its decision, the court placed particular
emphasis on the lack of any safe harbor protection in cases where
courts initiate sanctions. 148 Specifically, the court stated, "[tlhe 1993
amendments to Rule 11 strike a sensible balance.., by making a
lawyer sanctionable for an objectively unreasonable submission and
at the same time affording the lawyer a 'safe harbor' opportunity to
reconsider and withdraw a submission challenged by an
adversary."' 149 However, the court explained, in the situation of a
court-initiated Rule 11 sanction, the absence of a "safe harbor"
provision creates the risks of being too lenient or too harsh to the
detriment of the adversary process:
[W]hen a lawyer's submission, unchallenged by an
adversary, is subject to sanction by a court, the absence of a
"safe harbor" opportunity to reconsider risks shifting the
balance to the detriment of the adversary process. The risk
is that lawyers will sometimes withhold submissions that
they honestly believe have plausible evidentiary support for
fear that a trial judge, perhaps at the conclusion of a
142. See In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 87-88.
145. Id. at 88.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 93.
148. Id. at 90-91.
149. Id. at 91.
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contentious trial, will erroneously consider their claimed
belief to be objectively unreasonable. This risk is
appropriately minimized, as the Advisory Committee
contemplated, by applying a "bad faith" standard to
submissions sanctioned without a "safe harbor" opportunity
to reconsider.15
0
The court also reasoned that when a court imposes contempt
sanctions pursuant to its inherent powers, a finding of bad faith on
the part of the attorney is required.' 5' Accordingly, the Second
Circuit concluded that, because the Advisory Committee
contemplated that courts would initiate sanctions proceedings only in
circumstances "akin to contempt," the drafters intended that the same
standards applicable to contempt proceedings also would apply under
Rule 11.152 Notably, the court limited its holding to situations where
the court does not provide an opportunity to correct or withdraw the
submission. 153
The dissenting judge in Pennie strongly criticized the majority
for ignoring the plain meaning of the Rule, as well as the weight of
authority in favor of using an objective reasonableness standard for
both party-initiated and sua sponte sanctions. 5 4 First, the dissent
explained that the plain language and structure of the Rule
demonstrate that the drafters intended a single standard-objective
reasonableness-to apply to all sanctions cases. 155 According to the
dissent, the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 11 (c) do not
150. Id.
151. Id. at 90.
152. Id. (explaining that "akin to a contempt" is analogous to the court's
inherent power to levy sanctions, which requires the court to make a finding of
"bad faith").
153. Id. at 91-92. Indeed, the court expressly declined to decide the
standard for sanctions proceedings initiated earlier in the lawsuit, when the
submission could be amended, corrected or withdrawn in response to the show
cause order, even though the Rule does not specifically guarantee a "safe
harbor" in court-initiated sanctions. Id. Thus, where the attorney has an
opportunity to withdraw or amend the submission, the objectively reasonable
standard may apply, even in the Second Circuit. In practice, however, the
Second Circuit's distinction is likely to be of little consequence. Courts rarely
issue orders to show cause until the end of proceedings, thus leaving the
offending party no opportunity to voluntarily withdraw or correct its paper.
154. Id. at 93-102 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 94 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
752 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:727
alter the provisions of Rule 11 (b), which control when sanctions are
appropriate. 56 Indeed, according to the dissent, regardless of how
sanctions are initiated, Rule 11 (b) requires that an attorney or party's
conduct be reasonable under the circumstances.'
5 7
The Pennie dissent next addressed the majority's reliance on the
Advisory Committee's Note, criticizing the majority for "bas[ing] its
holding on a single sentence" of the Committee Notes. 15 According
to the dissent, the Advisory Committee's statement that "show cause
orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a
contempt of court,"'159 does not require courts to apply the mens rea
requirement applicable to contempt proceedings. 160  Rather,
according to the dissent, the Advisory Committee's comment
"reflects ... [its] empirical observation about the frequency with
which show cause orders 'will... be issued."",16 1 Moreover, the
dissent argues that read as a whole, the Advisory Committee's Note
does not support the requirement for a finding of bad faith, because
the Committee Notes generally reflect a preference for providing the
courts with discretion to determine whether sanctions are
appropriate. 162 In fact, that discretion would be curbed significantly
by requiring courts to examine the subjective intent of the parties.
163
156. Id. (Underhill, J., dissenting). Rule 11 (b) provides that "[b]y presenting
to the court... a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances," the paper meets the standards set forth in (b)(1) through (b)(4).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b).
157. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 94 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Underhill, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority for "seek[ing] to
use procedural distinctions drawn in section (c), regarding how sanctions can
be imposed with and without a motion, to modify the substantive requirements
of section (b), which controls whether a violation of Rule 11 has occurred." Id.
(Underhill, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Underhill, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Underhill, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
160. Id. (Underhill, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 94-95 (Underhill, J., dissenting). Thus the dissent concludes that
the reference to contempt "describes the seriousness of the conduct likely to
prompt a court to issue a show cause order initiating sanctions proceedings, not
the mens rea necessary before sua sponte sanctions can permissibly be
imposed." Id. at 95 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 99 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Underhill, J., dissenting). The dissent further points out that the
advisory committee's note does not explain a return to a subjective standard,
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Finally, the dissent noted that the weight of authority is contrary
to the majority decision. 164 Indeed, the dissent accurately points out
that no other court interpreting the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 has
required a finding of bad faith before imposing sanctions under any
procedural circumstances. 165 Further, the dissent noted that the two
leading treatises in the field of federal court practice also recognize
that an "objective reasonableness" standard should be used in
imposing Rule 11 sanctions and explicitly reject the idea that Rule 11
requires a finding of "bad faith."' 6
In the months since the Pennie decision was issued, it has
which the drafters deleted from the original Rule in 1983. Id. (Underhill, J.,
dissenting). This, according to the dissent, indicates that the advisory
committee did not intend to revive the subjective standard. Id. (Underhill, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at 95-96 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 95 (Underhill, J., dissenting). The dissent stated, "With today's
decision, the Second Circuit becomes the first and only court to hold that the
1993 amendments to Rule 11 reverted to the pre-1983 subjective bad faith
standard for even a subset of Rule 11 sanctions." Id. at 93 (Underhill, J.,
dissenting). Notably, the majority responded to this argument by noting that
no court before it considered the specific argument of whether a bad faith
standard applies to a court-initiated show cause order issued when the
sanctioned party has no opportunity to withdraw or amend the offending paper.
Id. at 92 n.4. According to the majority, "[a]lthough [Hunter v. Earthgrains
Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2002)] involved a show cause order issued
in the absence of an opportunity to correct or withdraw the challenged
document, the Fourth Circuit's ruling was that the sanction should be vacated."
Id.
166. Id. at 96 (Underhill, J., dissenting) (stating that both Moore's Federal
Practice and Wright and Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure reject the bad
faith standard and interpret Rule 11 as requiring a standard of objective
reasonableness). As one scholar states, "'The 1993 Amendment eliminates
any possibility of reading the language in Rule 11 as establishing a subjective
standard .... ' Id, (Underhill, J., dissenting) (quoting CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D
§ 1335 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 2002). Though the original rule was construed to
require a showing of subjective "bad faith," which proved to be literally an
unattainable standard, the Rule was amended to require a more objective
standard. See id. (Underhill, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he 1983 version of
Rule 11 'had been interpreted to require a showing of subjective bad faith by
the signing attorney as an essential element of a violation. Since this proved to
be a virtually unattainable standard, the rule was amended to employ a more
objective standard."').
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received considerable criticism. 167 Nonetheless, Pennie has been
cited with some approval by at least one circuit court.168 In Kaplan
v. DaimlerChrysler, the Eleventh Circuit discussed favorably the
Pennie decision, but purported to join those circuits that apply an
objectively reasonable standard in determining whether a court erred
in awarding sanctions on its own initiative. 69 In Kaplan, the trial
court issued an order to show cause and ultimately imposed sanctions
on defense counsel for filing nineteen motions in limine on the eve of
trial, at least some of which the court found were "'undoubtedly filed
either for the illegitimate purpose of harassing opposing counsel and
the court on the eve of trial or to generate additional fees from
[counsel's] deep pocketed client."",17 0 The Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court's sanctions award.' 7 1  In doing so, the court
recognized that sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions must be reviewed with
"particular stringency" and purported to join those circuits who have
adopted an "akin to contempt" standard.' 72 Nonetheless, the court
did not reject Pennie's subjective bad faith standard, finding instead
that it did not need to reach the mens rea issue under the facts of the
case before it, because defense counsel's actions in filing the motions
in limine did not "meet the contempt-of-court level standard.' 7  The
Eleventh Circuit thus has left open the door for applying a mens rea
requirement in future cases.
174
167. See, e.g., Gregory P. Joseph, 'Sua Sponte' Sanctions, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
14, 2003, at B6.
168. See Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003).
Moreover, district courts within the Second Circuit, bound by stare decisis,
have followed the Pennie decision. See, e.g., Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 7168(RPP), 2003 WL 21373237, at
*10-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2003).
169. Kaplan, 331 F.3d at 1255.
170. Id. at 1254 (quoting the trial judge's Rule 11 sanctions order) (alteration
in original).
171. Id. at 1257.
172. Id. at 1255 (quoting In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 90 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
173. Id. at 1256.
174. Indeed, at least one district court in the Eleventh Circuit has applied a
bad faith standard as a result of the decision in Kaplan. See Johnson v. Barnes,
283 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1301 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 17, 2003) (explaining that "[t]he
Kaplan court saw no need to decide whether [a subjective bad faith] standard
applies in the Eleventh Circuit" but "[olut of an abundance of caution.., the
Court will assume that it is required in this case.").
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It remains to be seen whether the Eleventh Circuit, or another
court faced with the issue, will follow Pennie in requiring a showing
of bad faith in court-initiated sanctions proceedings. More likely, the
Second Circuit will stand alone on this issue. In our view, the
Pennie majority incorrectly read a mens rea requirement into Rule
11. As the Pennie dissent aptly explained, the majority opinion not
only rejects the weight of authority, which requires the application of
an objective reasonableness standard in all cases, but also ignores the
plain language of Rule 11.175 Moreover, by providing a heightened
standard for determining when courts may impose sanctions, the
Second Circuit limits the ability of the courts to exercise their
discretion to deter costly and meritless claims and allows litigants to
avoid sanctions, even if their actions are patently unreasonable.
B. The Safe Harbor Provision
Unlike the case of court-initiated sanctions, a party seeking to
impose sanctions must first serve the opposing party with a Rule 11
motion at least twenty-one days before presenting the motion to the
court, then file the motion with the court. 176 This "safe harbor" gives
a litigant twenty-one days to correct or withdraw the challenged
submission in order to avoid the imposition of sanctions before the
motion is filed with the court.
177
While the safe harbor provision appears to be relatively
straightforward, the application of the provision has been the subject
of some dispute both among and within some circuits. For example,
until recently, every circuit to have considered the issue treated the
175. See In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 87-88, 90-93 (2d Cir.
2003).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(c)(1)(A).
177. Id. The Advisory Committee explained the rationale for the safe harbor
provision as follows:
These provisions are intended to provide a type of "safe harbor"
against motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to
sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving
the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge
candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified
allegation. Under the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to
abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as evidence of a
violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the timely withdrawal of a
contention will protect a party against a motion for sanctions.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
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twenty-one day safe harbor as an absolute prerequisite to an award of
sanctions, thus refusing to affirm a sanctions award if the moving
party had failed to serve a motion upon the offending party prior to
filing, as contemplated by the Rule.' 78 Relying on the plain language
of the Rule, which provides that a sanctions motion "shall be served"
twenty-one days prior to filing, these courts reason that the twenty-
one day safe harbor provision was intended to be a mandatory,
absolute prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions.
79
1. The Fourth Circuit's difficulty with the issue of whether
the safe harbor provision is jurisdictional
However, the Fourth Circuit, for one, appears reluctant to read
Rule 1 (c)(1)(A) so narrowly.' 8 0 In two recent decisions, the Fourth
178. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789-90 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding that district court abused discretion for excusing
compliance with safe harbor provision); Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 788
(5th Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of Rule 11 sanctions, in part, because moving
party served sanctions motion on day of filing or shortly before); Cobleigh v.
United States, No. 97-2302, 1999 WL 195738, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999)
(vacating sanctions award where moving party did not comply with safe
harbor); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998); Ridder v. City of
Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1997) (vacating sanctions award
where motion was not served in compliance with safe harbor); Elliott v. Tilton,
64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the plain language of the rule
requires that a party be given notice and an opportunity to withdraw or correct
the offensive paper before sanctions can issue on motion of a party). But see
Rector v. Approved Fed. Say. Bank, 265 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that safe harbor may be waived if non-moving party fails to raise it as
a defense to sanctions award). But cf Perpetual Sec. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132,
142 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating sanctions award and remanding for
reconsideration of sanctions issue where appellant was not afforded benefits of
safe harbor provision and did not indicate it would have corrected or amended
its frivolous arguments if given the opportunity); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing
Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying the imposition of Rule
11 sanctions because the complaining party did not comply with the safe
harbor requirement, and noting that party likely would have withdrawn or
corrected papers if given opportunity).
179. See, e.g., Ridder, 109 F.3d at 296 ("The plain language of Rule 11
specifies that unless a movant has complied with the twenty-one day 'safe
harbor' service, the motion for sanctions 'shall not be filed with or presented to
the court."'); Elliot, 64 F.3d at 216 (recognizing that the plain language of Rule
11 (c) indicates that the safe harbor provision is mandatory).
180. See Brickwood Contractors v. Datanet Eng'g, 335 F.3d 293 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that a court may consider a moving party's failure to comply
with the safe harbor provision when deciding a Rule 11 motion, even if the
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Circuit has opened the door for courts in its jurisdiction to award
sanctions, despite the moving party's non-compliance with the safe
harbor provision, if the nonmoving party fails to raise the
noncompliance argument in its opposition to the sanctions motion.
However, it appears that the Fourth Circuit is still grappling with this
issue. 181 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit recently decided to consider the
issue en banc, thus raising doubt as to whether the Fourth Circuit will
continue to follow its current approach to the safe harbor provision.
In its first decision on the issue, Rector v. Approved Federal
Savings Bank,8 2 the Fourth Circuit became the first to hold that the
safe harbor provision may be waived. In Rector, a defendant brought
a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff shortly after the district
court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint as frivolous.' 83 Although
the defendant stated in its motion that it served the plaintiff more
than twenty-one days prior to filing with the court, the plaintiff
denied that it received the motion prior to the date it was filed, and
the defendant conceded that it could not confirm that the motion was
served on the plaintiff as stated in the motion.' 84 The district court
awarded sanctions against the plaintiff, despite the defendant's
argument was not raised by the parties); Rector v. Approved Fed. Sav. Bank,
265 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that failure to comply with safe
harbor provision is not jurisdictional, and thus may be waived if non-moving
party fails to raise it as a defense to a sanctions motion).
181. See Brickwood, 335 F.3d at 293, vacated, reh'g en banc granted
No. 00-2324, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15197, at *1 (4th Cir. July 30, 2003).
182. 265 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2001).
183. Id. at 249-51. The defendant's filing of a motion for sanctions after the
court dismissed the complaint raises the issue of whether the safe harbor
provision is violated if a party may bring a motion for sanctions after the
dismissal of a case. Compare Retail Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Beaulieu
of Am., LLC., 339 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing a sanctions
award where the moving party served its sanctions motion after the dismissal
of the complaint), with Barker v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., No. 97-5787,
slip op. 1998 WL 466437, at *2 (6th Cir. July 30, 1998) (affirming a sanctions
award where the motion was filed after dismissal of the complaint, but the
moving party had sent letters to the sanctioned party prior to dismissal warning
"in no uncertain terms" of its intent to seek sanctions). For a thorough
discussion of this issue, see Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These
Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its Impact on
Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV.
1, 49-61 (2002).
184. Rector, 265 F.3d at 250.
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noncompliance with the safe harbor provision. 8 5  Notably, the
plaintiff did not raise the safe harbor argument either in its response
to the motion for sanctions or in a subsequent appeal of the sanctions
amount.
1 86
On the second appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court
erred in awarding sanctions because the defendant failed to comply
with the requirements of the safe harbor provision. 87 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the award of sanctions.!
s8
Although the court recognized that a majority of circuits have treated
the safe harbor provision as mandatory, the court also noted that no
circuit has expressly termed the provision "jurisdictional" and thus
declined to do so.189 Instead, the court drew an analogy between the
safe harbor provision and a statute of limitations, which may be
raised as an affirmative defense, but if waived, does not deprive the
court ofjurisdiction to hear a claim.190 The Fourth Circuit explained,
by analogy, that the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 is mandatory, in
that failure to follow its requirements may defeat a sanctions motion,
but not jurisdictional, because like a statute of limitations, the safe
harbor provision may be waived if the nonmoving party fails to raise
it as a defense to the Rule 11 motion.
191
The dissenting judge in Rector harshly criticized the majority
decision for ignoring the plain language of the statute and the
"institutional protections" it was designed to afford litigants.' 92 First,
the dissent criticized the majority for ignoring Rule 1 I's clear
command that a motion for sanctions "'shall not be filed with or
presented to the court"' unless the requirements of the safe harbor
provision are met.' 93 According to the dissent, the Rule 11 drafters'
use of the mandatory term "shall," "'creates an obligation impervious
to judicial discretion.'"194 The dissent then concluded that, contrary
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 253-54.
189. Id. at 251-53.
190. Id. at 252-53.
191. Id. at 253-54.
192. Id. at 254 (King, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(1)(A)).
194. Id. at 255 (quoting Lexicon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)).
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to the majority's position, the language of Rule 11 creates a
jurisdictional requirement.195 Finally, the court considered the policy
implications of imposing sanctions where the moving party failed to
comply with the safe harbor provision. 196 The dissent criticized the
majority's assertion that Rule 11 primarily "protects litigants,"
asserting instead that Rule lI's "overriding institutional purpose" is
to "conserv[e] the valuable time and resources of two federal
courts."' 197 This purpose, the dissent argued, is frustrated when
courts consider sanctions against parties who, if given the
opportunity, might have withdrawn the offending papers.'
9
In a more recent decision, Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v.
Datanet Engineering,'99 the Fourth Circuit retreated somewhat from
its decision in Rector by recognizing that a court may consider the
safe harbor argument, even if a party has waived it.2 0 In Brickwood,
as in Rector, the defendants filed a Rule 11 motion without first
serving it on the plaintiff.201  The plaintiff failed to raise the
defendants' violation of the safe harbor provision in its opposition to
the motion.202 The district court awarded sanctions, and the plaintiff
appealed contending, for the first time, that the motion was filed in
violation of the safe harbor provision.203  Although it refused to
explicitly overrule Rector, the Fourth Circuit reversed the sanctions
award against the plaintiff because the motion was not filed in
compliance with the safe harbor provision.20 4 In doing so, the court
noted that the vast majority of courts have found that strict
compliance with the Rule is mandatory to a sanctions award.20 5
195. Id. at 256-57. In reaching its conclusion, the dissent reasoned that the
safe harbor provision is more analogous to the time limits imposed on the
filing of appeals by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at
256. The dissent explained that just as courts possess no authority to extend
the filing deadline under Rule 4, they do not possess the power to alter the
twenty-one day period required by the safe harbor provision. Id.
196. Id. at 257.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 335 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2003).
200. Id. at 296.
201. Id. at 294.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 295-96.
205. Id.
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According to the Fourth Circuit, even though the plaintiff previously
had not raised the safe harbor provision as a defense to the sanctions
motion, such "'does not preclude thisCourt from considering it sua
sponte in order to reach the correct result."'
206
The Fourth Circuit's decisions in Rector and Brickwood, for
now at least, allow a'party seeking sanctions in some instances to
evade the safe harbor provision, in clear contravention of the plain
language of the Rule.2 °7 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit's approach not
only disregards the plain language of the Rule, but also frustrates its
purpose-to protect litigants seeking to assert novel claims, or
arguments by giving them the opportunity to withdraw an offensive
pleading prior to facing sanctions. However, as stated, the court is
apparently reconsidering the issue en banc.
2. The Seventh Circuit's more flexible approach to the safe harbor
provision in Divane
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit also has taken a
somewhat flexible approach to determining whether a party has
complied with the technical requirements of the safe harbor
provision by allowing a previously filed but denied motion to serve
as an appropriate warning for purposes of the safe harbor rule.208 In
Divane v. Krull Electric Co., the trustee of an employee benefit fund
sued the defendant for its failure to make contributions to the fund.209
The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, but in its answer,
refused to admit certain facts that it already had admitted in a prior
lawsuit between the parties.210 The trustee filed a motion to dismiss
the counterclaim, also requesting that the court strike the defendant's
206. Id. at 296 (quoting Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253,
256 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987)). The Brickwood court reconciled its decision with the
Rector decision by pointing to a general principle of appellate review that a
court may consider arguments not raised in the district court or even on appeal
in order to reach the correct result. Id.
207. See supra Part H.B. 1.
208. See Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 1999);
see also Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
sanctions where the moving party served a warning letter rather than a
sanctions motion, as required by Rule 11).
209. Divane, 200 F.3d at 1022-23.
210. Id. at 1023.
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answer and enter sanctions under Rule 11.211 The court denied the
motion, and a trial followed. 12 At trial, the court found that the
defendant had not substantiated the factual allegations in its
counterclaim. 213 Upon leave of the court, the trustee then filed with
the court a motion for sanctions and attorneys' fees, serving the
motion upon the defendant at the same time.21 4 The district court
granted the motion for sanctions.
215
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sanctions award.216
The court first noted that the procedures required by Rule 11 (c) "are
designed to give [the nonmoving party] a full and fair opportunity to
respond and show cause before sanctions are imposed." The court
further stated that it agreed with those circuits, such as the Sixth and
Ninth, who have found that the safe harbor provision is "not merely
an empty formality."218 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit held that
the trustee complied with the safe harbor provision, including the
twenty-one day notice requirement, because the trustee served a Rule
11 motion informing the defendant of its intent to move for sanctions
on the counterclaim in its original motion to strike portions of the
defendant's answer. 219 According to the Seventh Circuit, the district
court's denial of the motion to dismiss the counterclaim did not
extinguish the motion for sanctions; rather it "effectively extended
the safe harbor for [the defendant] until trial, by which time the
factual basis for the answer and counterclaim would have been
determined. ,220 Under this analysis, the court found that the
defendant had many more than the twenty-one days contemplated by
the provision to correct or withdraw its pleadings.221 The Seventh
Circuit thus was able both to find that the trustee effectively
211. Id. at 1023-24.
212. Id. at 1024.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1031.
217. Id. at 1025.
218. Id. at 1026.
219. Id. at 1026-27.
220. Id. at 1027. The court noted that the district court should have reserved
judgment on Rule 11 sanctions pending the trial, rather than dismissing the
motion outright as premature, but did not find that the district court's action
altered the result. Id.
221. Id.
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complied with the sanctions award and to affirm the imposition of
sanctions.
2 2 2
Although in Divane the Seventh Circuit approved of the district
court's sanctions award despite the moving party's noncompliance
with the letter of the safe harbor provision, it did so by trying to
characterize the moving party's conduct as something that fit within
the confines of the safe harbor provision. 223 Ultimately, both the
Seventh and the Fourth Circuits agree that a moving party must
comply with the safe harbor provisions. However, compared to their
sister circuits, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear more reluctant
to allow the technical requirements of the Rule to preclude sanctions
that are otherwise warranted. Consequently, litigants in these
circuits are faced with the very dilemma the safe harbor provision
was designed to prevent-if they pursue a novel claim or position,
they risk sanctions, without the guarantee of a clear opportunity to
withdraw the offending paper. Our view, like that of the majority of
circuits, is that the safe harbor provision is jurisdictional, and that the
movant's failure to observe the twenty-one day safe harbor should be
an absolute bar to a sanctions award.
III. CONCLUSION
The courts of appeals have approached Rule 11, and the balance
of competing policy interests that the Rule embodies, in different
ways. In general, for example, the Seventh Circuit's Rule 1 1
decisions appear to place relatively more emphasis on the goal of
reducing frivolous claims and attorney tactics that harass, delay or
222. Id. at 1031.
223. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Divane raises another requirement of
the safe harbor provision on which the courts disagree: whether a party
complies with the safe harbor provision by issuing a warning to the party
against whom sanctions are sought, even if the warning is not in the form of
the sanctions motion to be filed with the court. Compare Hutchinson v. Pfeil,
208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring service of the sanctions
motion, as stated in the Rule), with Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d
804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the moving party substantially complied
with the safe harbor provision by sending a warning letter rather than a motion
for sanctions) and First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.,
307 F.3d 501, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that serving a warning letter
rather than the motion, may suffice to show compliance with the safe harbor
provision). For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Hart, supra note
183, at 40-42.
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cause undue expense. 224  In contrast, other circuits, such as the
Second Circuit, appear to place relatively more emphasis on the goal
of not chilling the presentation of novel legal contentions or zealous
advocacy.
225
In the areas that we examined in this article-the circuit courts'
improper purpose analyses, the standard to be applied when the
district courts sanction on their own initiative, and the application of
the safe harbor provision-these differences in emphasis have led to
different implementations of Rule 11. We agree with the majority of
circuits, and the dissent in Pennie, that an objective standard should
be applied to all Rule 11 inquiries, even those assessed on the district
court's own initiative.226 We also agree with the majority of circuits
that have concluded that the safe harbor is jurisdictional and must be
strictly applied to each sanctions motion. 227 It would be a positive
development for Rule 11 jurisprudence if the Fourth Circuit were to
reach that conclusion in its rehearing of the Brickwood case.
In one area, that of improper purpose analysis, we believe that
the important questions regarding the extent to which sanctioning
nonfrivolous complaints and other papers for improper purpose may
impinge on the First Amendment right to petition the courts, or
otherwise discourage zealous advocacy, should be addressed by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Our view is that the potential
chilling effect of such sanctions warrants recommending an
amendment to the Rule that makes clear that nonfrivolous papers,
including complaints may not be sanctioned for improper purpose.
224. See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th
Cir. 1987) (stating that non-frivolous complaints may be sanctioned for
improper purpose).
225. See e.g., In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d. Cir.
2003) (requiring finding of bad faith before court may impose sanctions
because "[a] vigorous adversary process is better served by avoiding the
inhibiting effect of an 'objectively unreasonable' standard applied to
unchallenged submissions").
226. See discussion supra Parts I.A., II.A.2.
227. See discussion supra Part H.B.
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